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英文翻译（关于经济的）
3. Determinants of intra-firm trade
Trade is basically internalized as a means to reduce transaction costs in arm’s-length contracting, which may arise due to failures in commodity or information markets (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Casson, 1979). Partly depending on the nature of transaction costs, however, international business activities can be organized in different ways. In particular, vertical integration involves specialization, as different units complement each other, and requires intra-firm trade in intermediate products. Hence, operations are concentrated in a relatively small number of large plants which trade among each other. Trade liberalization, dissimilar technologies at different stages of production, variation in factor prices and economies of scale at the plant level, favor this kind of organization. In contrast, horizontal integration means that operations resemble those in the parent company. The rationale lies in potential gains from internalizing markets for proprietary assets such as, e.g. a patent or a trade mark, superior management techniques or greater access to financial resources. Foreign production is motivated by the need for proximity to the local market, and less exports are expected. In this case, an affiliate’s sales compete with the parent’s arm’s-length exports, without any off-setting increase in parent exports of intermediate goods. However, if the affiliate manufactures only a certain fraction of the firm’s full range of products, imports of complementary finished goods can benefit from economies of scope in distribution.
In the following, we analyze whether variations in the size and structure of internalized trade can be related to organizational mode. The propensity of foreign affiliates’ to import, to import intermediate goods and to import finished goods from the parent company are used as dependent variables in three separate regressions. The hypotheses regarding independent variables are based on links between vertical and horizontal integration with intra-firm trade in intermediate products and complementary supplies of finished products, respectively. It should be stressed, however, that the two modes of organization are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Both types can be present to varying degrees in MNEs, and individual companies or affiliates cannot easily be classified in accordance with either type. Here we use proxy variables for either mode of organization, or variables which are likely to influence the propensity to import given a certain form of organization. Based on previous theoretical and empirical findings, factors influencing intra-firm trade are broken down into features relating to the firm, the affiliate, and the host country.
3.1. Firm-related explanations
Investment in research and development (R&D) has been found to be positively correlated with intra-firm trade (see Lall, 1978; Buckley and Pearce, 1979; Zejan, 1989). Lall argued that internalization of trade is most probable when finished and intermediate goods are highly specific and embody proprietary information. Studying US firms, Sleuwaegen (1985) found R&D intensity, although high in both cases, to be more strongly correlated with trade in intermediate products than in finished goods. Nevertheless, the lack of well-functioning markets for intangible assets should motivate internalization of both product types. It has been suggested that increasing multinationality, measured as the share of foreign to total assets of a firm, should lower the dependence of affiliates on parent supplies. Presuming that MNEs are vertically organized, Pearce (1982) and Zejan (1989) argued that trade is enhanced among foreign affiliates rather than with the parent. However, Andersson and Fredriksson (1996) found multinationality to be negatively related to the export intensity of affiliates, speaking for a connection with horizontal rather than vertical integration. Irrespective of organizational mode, the relative weight of the parent should decline with multinationality, suggesting a smaller propensity of affiliates to import both kinds of products. The presence of scale economies at the plant level favors vertical integration and concentration of operations in a limited number of large units. The greater the number of production sites, and the smaller their size, by contrast, the more likely is horizontal expansion.
3.2. Affiliate-related explanations
A high propensity to export to third countries implies international specialization of production and, hence, should favor imports of intermediate products from the parent company. By contrast, emphasis on the host market suggests that the affiliate’s distribution system can effectively be exploited also for goods produced by other parts of the company group. Thus, a low export ratio, other things equal, increases the propensity to import finished products. Exports back home may also indicate specialization of production in the form of backward integration. If operating at an early stage in the value-added chain, an affiliate should be expected to have a low propensity to import intermediates. In contrast, if a unit is at the end of the production chain, exporting semi-processed or finished goods, it is likely to rely on supplies of input goods from the parent company. Meanwhile, affiliates which re-export a large proportion of their output back home are unlikely to import much finished goods.
In Section 2, we observed substantial differences in trade behavior depending on the mode of establishment. Broadly speaking, a manufacturing subsidiary can be established in three ways. Firstly, a former sales unit can develop assembly operations, which is particularly probable in the case of complex durable products requiring local adaptation and extensive after-sales services. Given the already developed system for marketing in such units, continued finished goods supplies from the parent can be expected (Andersson et al., 1996). Secondly, the establishment of an affiliate through acquisition has been shown to reduce the overall propensity to import from parent companies (Zejan, 1989), but impacts on the separate components of intra-firm trade have so far not been investigated.
Because imports of intermediates can be anticipated to require costly adjustment of
already existing production assets, takeover should be negatively related to such imports. As access to already established distribution channels is an important motive for takeover (Caves, 1982), however, a positive impact can be expected on imports of finished products. Thirdly, green-field investments enable an MNE to tailor a foreign plant from the start so as to fit the organization as a whole. This entry mode has been found to be more likely the greater the MNE’s reliance on firm-specific technology (Andersson and Svensson, 1994), and should favor imports of intermediate goods.
3.3. Host country-related explanations
Taxes and tariffs influence MNEs’ trade behavior, e.g. as transfer pricing is used to redistribute profits. Vertical relations should be counteracted by trade barriers and geographical distance. At the same time, Table 4 showed that affiliates in Asia and developed countries outside Europe and North America displayed the highest
propensity to import from their Swedish parent companies.
Market and production conditions in the host country also play an important role for the trading behavior of affiliates. The demand for sophisticated customer services, which tend to require a local presence, is related to income. Consumers’ demand for variety also grows with income, further suggesting that the propensity of affiliates to import complementary finished goods increases in the income level of the host country. Regarding intermediate products, traditional factor proportions models speak for a positive impact of widening factor cost differentials. On the other hand, imperfect competition models have suggested that an increasing discrepancy in factor costs — conversely related to the income level of host countries — counteracts intermediate goods’ trade by vertically integrated MNEs (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). There are also arguments for vertical specialization among high-income countries, particularly in knowledge-intensive production whose location may depend more on a free flow of trade, the quality of infrastructure, worker skills and the presence of qualified buyers and suppliers, than on factor cost differentials (c.f. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Braunerhjelm and Svensson, 1994; Andersson and Fredriksson, 1996). However, the availability of qualified local subcontractors should reduce the dependence on input goods from 7 the home country. Thus, unless traditional factor models are valid, the relationship between income level and affiliates’ propensity to import intermediates is ambiguous a priori.
According to Kravis and Lipsey (1982), large host markets enable firms to meet high entry costs and exploit economies of scale at the plant level, thereby attracting specialized and export-oriented activities. This suggests a positive relationship between intra-firm imports of intermediates and market size. Other empirical studies have shown that large markets are most likely to be served by local production (Swedenborg, 1979; Culem, 1988;Veugelers, 1991). Since a large market should facilitate a greater scale in production at the plant level, complementary imports of finished goods should decline with growing host market size.